Pacifism in a time of war and chaos [American Politics #16]

Ted Grimsrud—March 10, 2025

I am deeply troubled by the wars and rumors of war, the social chaos, and the strong sense of pessimism that seem to be so much a part of our current situation. I also feel confused, uncertain, and relatively powerless. At such a moment, reflection on my core convictions is one way to steady my nerves, if nothing else. Almost exactly three years, a couple of weeks after Russia’s intensifying the conflict with Ukraine with their “special military operation,” I published a blog post on my Thinking Pacifism site that came out of such reflection, “Thinking as an American pacifist about the Russian invasion.” In this post, I want to update the thoughts I shared then.

“Pacifism” as a core conviction

It is challenging to be a pacifist in an environment with a strong cultural consensus in favor of military action. The United States has been deeply involved in the war that has been going on in Ukraine since 2014. When that conflict greatly intensified three years ago, the US prowar consensus also intensified, with both strong support for accelerated military aid for Ukraine and strong condemnation of Russia, usually couched as condemnation of Russian leader Vladimir Putin. It has been virtually impossible to find dissent from the insistence on support for war in the American mainstream media, among Democratic Party politicians, and in my social media circles. But this support for war is at odds with my pacifist convictions.

I do believe that being a minority, even a small minority, due to one’s convictions is not a good reason to weaken one’s convictions. We should, of course, always be open to testing the validity of our convictions in face of challenges. However, it is actually to be expected that pacifist convictions will not widely be shared when the cultural zeitgeist favors war. Rather than doubt the validity of my pacifist convictions, I want to ask how these convictions speak to my warist context.

I use “pacifism” here to refer to a fairly general belief. I use it as roughly equivalent to, say, being a humane person, a person who supports social and political self-determination for all people, a person who affirms the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pacifism affirms that to support war is antithetical to humane values, to the practice of self-determination, and to an affirmation of universal human rights. In what follows, when I use “we” I mean those of us who affirm these pacifist convictions (even if one may not like to use the term “pacifism” itself—I use this term as a convenient rubric for this set of convictions, but I care about the convictions more than the term itself).

A pacifist, in this sense, will be suspicious of all those who do support warfare, especially those who profit from it. We distrust our most powerful media outlets and the spokespeople for our military policies and military-oriented responses to crises. We seek to be self-conscious about the impact of the mass media in shaping people in our society to support America’s military policies and practices and preparations. It takes an effort to resist that shaping.

How might pacifism speak to our current context?

(1) We condemn all overt acts of war. This starting point means we condemn Russia’s drastic escalation of the conflict with Ukraine three years ago. We believe that every overt act of war is wrong. So, we do not condemn Russia’s actions simply because they are done by a nation that the United States opposes. We condemn them because warring actions are inherently wrong. Crucially, if actions are wrong when the Russians do them, they are also wrong when the US and our allies do them.

We recognize the dangers of having our revulsion toward Russia’s actions channeled into support for militarist responses by our country and its allies. Given our distrust of the motives and interests of the American National Security leadership and its influence on our corporate media, we will be slow to join in the “official” US condemnation of Russian actions and acceleration of the conflict. We are cautious not due to an ideological embrace of “neutrality” as if we should avoid involvement in the world’s affairs. Rather, we seek to remain clear and committed to our core convictions about human rights, self-determination, and the preciousness of all life—at all times. War by its very nature needs to be rejected no matter who executes it.

(2) A pacifist-inclined perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict will be especially concerned with retaining moral sight, with keeping core convictions about human wellbeing in mind. This kind of perspective is not about maintaining a sense of purity or avoiding moral ambiguity or compromise. Ambiguity and compromise seem inevitable for anyone engaged in public policy conversations. However, quite often moral values and important convictions are ignored or dismissed as irrelevant.

American history over the past 80 years offers many examples where retaining a sense of moral sight would have had great pragmatic (and not only idealistic) value. Such moral sight may have prevented what were strategically and practically deeply problematic choices—for example, the American disasters in Vietnam and Iraq. The bad choices came on all levels, from the policymakers at the top to soldiers trying to implement the choices on the ground to ordinary citizens offering support for the disastrous choices. Those attracted to pacifism should resist the charge that their perspective is too idealistic and impractical. We will point to the “out of touch idealism” and “impracticality” of the various military actions that have resulted from sidelining moral sight and that led to terrible, self-destructive consequences.

(3) It is important to be attentive toward the historical context for the current crisis. What is going on right now is part of a longer trajectory. Russian-Ukrainian relationships have an especially complicated and fraught history. Ignoring or misreading that history will lead to important misunderstandings when people reduce the current conflict simply to the most recent actions taken by Russian leadership. The Russian warring actions should be condemned, but they also need to be understood in their historical context if truly sustainable solutions are to be found.

Given the abysmal record of America’s national security elite and the corporate media in past conflicts such as Vietnam and Iraq, we should be suspicious of the historical framing they offer now. We should seek for genuine understanding and avoid “explanations” that most of all serve pro-militarist interests. We should especially attend to understandings that help us perceive legitimate interests on all sides that could be addressed through diplomacy and negotiations. A major historical factor in this conflict has been NATO’s expansion to the east, leading to threatened inclusion of Ukraine. From the time of the end of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, even many members of the American national security establishment warned against such expansion, arguing that it was highly dangerous—and were disregarded. Those warnings ring true today.

(4) We should be attentive to who benefits from this war and treat what they say about it with great suspicion. From the time of the ending of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, American policies of expanding NATO into central and eastern Europe greatly enriched US weapons makers. More recently, transferring massive amounts of military materials to Ukraine further enriched those corporations—who also have had great influence on policymakers.

American elites are not disinterested actors in this drama. They have greatly benefited from NATO’s actual and threatened expansion. The reality that the people who make the decisions and frame the discussion of how to respond to the conflict are partisans who directly profit from the conflict being escalated means we should be suspicious of what they say. As a simple principle, we could suggest that until the profit motive is taken out of American national security dynamics, we will treat any policy suggestions that involve money being spent that goes to American war profiteers with great skepticism.

(5) American pacifists should do their moral reasoning in light of their own convictions and most of all apply those convictions to the practical choices and actions that are available to them in their actual lives—not think primarily in terms of the people in power. That is not to say that we shouldn’t try to discern what seem like the best choices that decision-makers can choose, but that should not cause us to set aside our own best moral convictions.

Too easily, we fall into the mentality where the values that determine how we think and act in relation to warfare are not the ones we hold but the ones we imagine are held by people in power. Such a way of thinking sidelines our best insights. It also makes us more vulnerable to being caught up in the war fever and moved toward accepting, supporting, even participating in actions that are not consistent with our core convictions. When we work within our own set of convictions, we are more likely to find alternatives to the war fever.

(6) Accept our relative powerlessness. American pacifists have little direct effect on the violence-inducing policies of our government. We do have the power to dissent. We have the power to point to alternative policies that could emerge in the face of the failures of war-oriented policies. We have the power to think independently and creatively outside the war fevered consensus. That could result in any number of possibilities for healing actions now unforeseen. We have the power to make connections with others across the world who also reject war.

Perhaps most fundamentally, living amidst war fever when we see so little chance of our voices being heard by the power elite may remind us of the value of the simple work of creating space to be human in the world around us that we can affect. I think we should remain attentive to the big issues, wars and rumors of war. However, our powerlessness concerning the decisions that are being made in relation to those big issues challenges us to find ways to express the power that we do have to make the world more just and peaceable.

(7) Avoid demonizing those we are told are our “enemies.” One of the big dangers in our current conflict is the dynamic reflected in the words of our leaders, media pundits, military spokespeople, and the like to reduce the conflict to the allegedly irrational and egotistical behavior of Putin. This echoes past moments where the “enemy” is presented as impervious to negotiation, reason, or compromise (an obvious example is Saddam Hussein). Such demonization often serves as a justification for our own violence and militarized policies.

When we see our “enemy” as incapable of reason, we then need not bother with negotiations, compromises, and other alternatives to brute threat and force. Such dynamics often are likely to be disastrous and to fail to resolve the conflicts. Perpetual conflict and having on-going “enemies” serve the interests of those whose power and wealth is enhanced by wars and (especially) preparation for wars. None of this implies anything positive about Putin. However, it is problematic pragmatically to ignore ways to resolve conflicts without militarized policies because of this demonizing. It is also problematic morally to assume the worst of one’s adversary and not to be suspicious of one’s own government’s motives in escalating conflicts that lead to profits for powerful forces in one’s country.

A key problem, in the view of the pacifist, is how nations deal with conflict. War and preparation for war and threatening war are our biggest enemies of all. To the extent that the current Trump administration seems to want to work for peace in Ukraine, their efforts should be welcomed. However, we dare not weaken our critical faculties but rather continue our scrutiny of the actual effects of unfolding policies and priorities. I remain skeptical of all of the leaders of the American Empire. A kind of “peace” in Ukraine that will contribute to more conflict with China or in the Middle East will not be a very positive step. Consistent attention to core pacifist convictions will help us not be misled by our national leaders.

More posts on American Politics

5 thoughts on “Pacifism in a time of war and chaos [American Politics #16]

  1. Thanks, Ted. Many great principles and thoughts here…. Too much to respond to even in summary. So I’ll focus on just the excellent concluding paragraph. This statement I find very important, “A kind of “peace” in Ukraine that will contribute to more conflict with China….” You stipulate more than just China, rightly.

    But for brevity, let me seek your input on a pacifist approach to just the China/Taiwan tension (I’d say “conflict” also, though not “kinetic” so far).  Should we, as individuals or banded into a group(s) attempt to get our congressional reps (including Senators) to change current American policy or adopt a particular one? For example, my understanding is that we officially back a “one China” position, while unofficially backing the ongoing independence of Taiwan. And backing it with military support and lots of military equipment/spending.

    Now, my strong supposition (which, of course, could be wrong) is that IF we withdrew all military equipment and intelligence support along with the at least clearly implied promise of using our military to defend against a Chinese invasion, that China would indeed use great threat and pressure to assume control over Taiwan. And if Taiwan didn’t succumb, it would be militarily invaded. And that military resistance… war… would result, even if we were no longer helping them, probably a very high casualty war, despite China’s overwhelming advantage. [It appears my full comment won’t post, so I’ll break it in about half here… to be continued.]

  2. [comment above continued]:

    This question is an honest (not an entrapment) one: how should any of us wanting to apply your conclusion, appeal to our reps and/or propose solutions and/or cast our votes? Toward adopting a consistent one-China policy, meaning not militarily supporting Taiwan’s defense? Continuing present “complicated” policy but withdrawing military support and promised defense? Maybe either of those but adding in a robust and active role in seeking a compromise that might (however unlikely) be able to satisfy both sides? If the last option, should that include non-military but coercive (i.e., “violent” under broad definition) pressures on one or both sides, perhaps involving trade or other financial moves?

    The answers one works out to such questions would seem to come from within a general framework of principles for large, influential countries, as to if and how they can/should support nations or regionally “independent” (or “dug in”) peoples who are militarily threatened by much stronger neighbors. Or working out such answers might help to form that broader general set of principles for future application.

  3. I’ve just re-read your article here, Ted. The main reason is that I’ve encountered further comments by various commentators or “experts” on the Ukraine-Russia war, its antecedents, etc., and remain interested to understand the full situation better. Two of them have been Jeffrey Sachs and Anne Applebaum. I mention them specifically because comparing/contrasting their differing views seems like a “fair” comparison of two similarly accomplished people with a lot of overlap in their depth and sophistication as to their skills, and in their respective backgrounds and study on the situation.

    In an oversimplified way, we might say (my having gotten fair comparative data on this via ChatGPT) that Sachs is deeper on the economics and the diplomatic/geopolitical aspects, and that Applebaum is deeper (longer and more studied) on the historical and broader regional aspects. Additionally, he has spent more time actually in and working directly with Russia, and she, conversely, much more time in/with Poland and Ukraine, while a deep expert on many aspects of Russia as well. She logged significant time in and “close to the top” in Poland (married to a former Polish foreign and defense minister), and has close familiarity with the Baltics. (This relative difference itself MAY account for some of the differences in their analyses.)

    Both are very articulate and present strong summary cases that are mostly “in opposition” as to causes….

    Oversimplified: Sachs that the actions (and words) of the USA and NATO created genuine and significant fear (sense of being threatened) in Russians (exemplified in Putin but not restricted to him). Applebaum, conversely, that the actions (and words) of Russia provoked sufficient genuine fear in some Eastern European nations (particularly the Baltics and Poland, likely a few others) to lead them to join NATO when they otherwise would not have. (Thus creating the expansion of NATO that Sachs, with some others, says understandably spooked Russia.)

    So, this MAY again be akin to an earlier analogy of mine, apropos even for “experts” who lived around and/or worked within the developing problems: In hearing a conflicted couple describe “who started what”, it is often nearly impossible to be clear just what actions/words (or lack of them) set off what… what was “action” and what “reaction”. Finding reconciliation usually does not require figuring that out, and the counselor is better off focusing on expectations, interpretations, feelings, and how new understandings and expressions of that and of caring can move things forward positively.

    [continued in next comment… length restriction, apparently]

  4. [continued from above]

    Unfortunately, it is even more complex and close to impossible when it comes to warring nations. But to apply a principle, can Russia and Ukraine come to any agreement satisfactory to both of them that the settlement is likely to hold, long term?

    That does look very doubtful. It might be possible, if Sachs is right… and this point is one reason it may be pertinent, for whoever has real influence toward a peace deal, to properly assess the real motivations of Russia, as the invader… to get solid “security guarantees” from Russia. IF Ukraine’s promise to never pursue NATO membership (and/or NATO’s to promise to refuse them) would be combined with a compromise on what, if any, formerly Ukrainian territory would be ceded to Russia (or a “neutral state” created, or whatever), we might have a secure peace, on Sachs’ analysis.

    On the other hand, if Applebaum is right, it would seem that only a full abandonment of war and withdrawal by Russia would be able to potentially provide security for Ukraine, and perhaps for several other Russian-bordering or nearby nations. That’s because it would be either a forced or willing admission by Russia that all of pre-2014 Ukraine is sovereign Ukraine, and Russia has no legitimate claim over it, now or in the future. My understanding is that Russia (Putin in particular) is not willing to take such a position and mean it… I see his views as deeply engrained otherwise, probably combined with the goal of building the Russian empire as large and strong as possible, based on things he has said more than once.

    (More in detail, such a retreat and “admission” might possibly be accompanied by some method of determining whether small areas… certain eastern towns and Russia-bordering regions… should have an option of joining Russia, though at this point that seems highly problematic to fairly determine.)

    The insecurity in the minds of several European nations that have previously as well as now, felt threatened by Russia would likely remain if Ukraine “gives up too much” and that “rewards” Russian aggression. If feeling threatened is for valid reasons (which does seem to be supported historically… moreso than the historical actions of NATO which never involved any active aggression), it could mean that Russia, at some later date, will re-invade Ukraine and/or other relatively weak nearby nations, despite NATO. I realize this is the more conventional Western viewpoint disputed by Sachs, Miersheimer, and others. But I tend to trust the judgment and arguments of Applebaum (and other experienced, honorable people), based on her long exposure and at least a good awareness by her of the case on the “other side” and a deep knowledge of Russia and Putin (as I presume Sachs has also).

    Much more could easily be added to this, but I’ll conclude with this: There MAY be some harmonizing of the Sachs/Applebaum seeming binary, IF the issues are couched in some different way. I do not know what that might be. There is more to my leaning to Applebaum than I’ve gone into here, and I do acknowledge the first-hand involvement by Sachs in the economic/political aspect of post-Soviet Russia and the West… that is valuable — needs broader hearing, and I believe Sachs to be a thoughtful and honest analyst, as I do Applebaum.  

  5. Nation-states are artificial entities. There is nothing natural about them. Ukraine is a great example. 2014 Ukraine was an artificial entity with borders manipulated for political gain. Parts of it are much more Russian than Ukrainian in terms of the heritage of those who live there and the culture. This provides a certain logic to Russians in trying to incorporate those parts legally into Russia. The opposition to that internationally is based on Great Power politics, not on rational borders. The authoritarian Zelensky government has responded by banning use of the Russian language in many sectors, banning Russian cultural events, banning political parties representing those of Russian background, etc. Neither side wants to let the people of each area freely decide their political association.

    The political world denies the artificial nature of nation-states and assumes their legitimacy. Because their assumptions are faulty, so are their actions. The political and military struggle is waged in terms of accepting the artificial as representing something rational.

Leave a reply to Howard Pepper Cancel reply