Ted Grimsrud—September 12, 2025
One main characteristic of the US during my lifetime has been the centrality of “warism” to the nation’s sense of itself. By “warism” I mean war as central for the nation’s identity. Signs of the US as a warist society may be seen in all the money that the nation spends on preparing for war and the war-related priorities in the operation of our government. American warism may also be seen in the bipartisan consensus on miliary spending, one area where Democrats and Republicans always agree. Most of our government spending goes for war and war preparation. And the US spends way more on military-related items than anyone else in the rest of the world.
The myth of redemptive violence
What I will call the “myth of redemptive violence” grounds American warism. This myth is the quasi-religious belief that we gain “salvation” (that is, a sense of security and of meaning and purpose) through violence. People throughout history have put tremendous faith in using violence for such “salvation.” The amount of trust people put in such instruments may perhaps be seen most clearly in the amount of resources they devote to the preparation for war.
Theologian Walter Wink described how this myth works. His book Engaging the Powers asserts “violence is the ethos of our times. It is the spirituality of the modern world. It has been accorded the status of a religion, demanding from its devotees an absolute obedience to death.” This myth remains invisible as a myth. We assume violence to be simply part of the nature of things. We accept violence as factual, not based on belief. Thus, we remain unaware of the faith-dimension in accepting violence. We think we know as a fact that violence works, is necessary and inevitable. We do not realize we operate in the realm of belief in accepting violence.
This myth operates on many levels. Americans assume the need for violent state power to sustain order. We willingly subordinate ourselves with few questions to this power and regularly encounter the myth on the level of popular culture. The books we read, the movies and TV we watch reiterate the story of creation as grounded in violence and chaos. Thus, we need military and police violence to subdue chaos and dominate enemies. We must subordinate ourselves to people in authority who exercise this necessary and redemptive violence. We join in the exercise of violence against our nation’s enemies when called upon. We accept one of the world’s most powerful police systems and one of the world’s largest prison systems.
This myth makes the nation-state central. The nation’s welfare, defined by its leaders, has the highest value. “There can be no other gods before the nation,” Wink wrote. This myth places patriotic religion at the heart of the state and gives its imperialism divine sanction. War requires a kind of religious justification. Warists believe god gives states the right to order citizens to give money and even their lives to maintain order. “By divine decree, the state utilizes violence to cleanse the world of evil opponents who resist the nation’s sway. The name of god—any god, the Christian god included—blesses and favors the supremacy of the chosen nation and its rulers.”
Though American belief in the redemptive necessity of violence is old, World War II accelerated the evolution of the US into a warist society. For its sustenance, this warism relies on the myth of redemptive violence. Americans continue to embrace this myth even in face of troubling evidence. The myth’s resulting warism corrupts American democracy and destroys the country’s economy and physical environment—and as an unquestioned myth it is invulnerable to dissent even as the country spirals down from crisis to crisis.
The ideology of the national security state
Wink calls what has emerged as the operating framework for American warism “the ideology of the national security state.” He sets the date for this emergence as 1947, when the American government created two new political institutions that came to embody this ideology: the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. These two new agencies came after the creation a few years earlier of the centralized military structure in the Pentagon and the emerging nuclear weapons program. The US government established the National War College in 1948 to propagate the national security doctrine. Wink wrote, “These institutions were but the outer form of a new Power being spawned: the national security system.”
World War II played a crucial role in the emergence of this ideology and its attendant structures. All of American history does contain expressions of the national security ideology. However, prior to World War II, this ideology had only limited influence. As recently as the mid-1930s, American military spending remained minimal. Powerful political forces opposed involvement in “foreign entanglements.” President Franklin Roosevelt, long a supporter of American military force, felt constrained in his ability to pursue interventionist policies in the years leading up to World War II. In fact, his efforts to get the U.S. formally to enter the War (the last time going to war would depend upon Congressional declaration of war) succeeded only after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and Germany’s declaration of war on the US.
The War opened many possibilities for the advocates of the American national security ideology. Wink characterizes the doctrine of the national security state as follows: “The survival of the nation is the absolute goal. National strategy intends to incorporate the whole nation into the national survival plan, to make it the total and unconditional object of each citizen’s life. In this view, all times are times of war. Peace is nothing more than the conventional name given to the continuation of war by other means. All politics is a politics of war.”
We may see in American history a continual struggle between a “democracy story” and an “empire story.” World War II brought a decisive turn in this struggle. Prior to World War II, when America engaged in military conflict (and tended more toward the empire story), at the end of the conflict the nation demobilized (tending back toward the democracy story). Since 1945, there has been no full demobilization because we have moved directly from World War II to the Cold War to the War on Terror. We have moved into a situation where “all times are times of war.” The national security ideology links closely with the myth of redemptive violence. The purveyors of this ideology use the language, rituals, and symbols of already existing religions. They justify their use of violence in the name of God and Christian faith.
One key question about the national security state clearly reveals its religious dimension: Why would non-elites who bear terrible costs in a permanent war society submit to warism, in many cases offering intense support and, in times of war, suffering great consequences? We may find the answer in the promise of “salvation.” That is, the promise of security, of validation of one’s identity as an American, and of meaning and purpose. As I reflect on my own willingness to offer such support in face of the possibility of being drafted to go to the Vietnam War in the early 1970s, I add one other element. I felt a desire for “salvation” simply by being influenced by the embedded theology of blank check nationalism. Americans don’t typically even have an awareness of the assumptions that they accept about their nation and its demands on them.
The need for an enemy
The evolution of the US into a full-fledged national security state required the presence of a “threat” that could justify its tremendous costs. To expand our military presence to a global system of bases and other outposts, to devote resources to develop our nuclear weapons system, to justify the extraordinary risks such a system presented, to sustain support for a peacetime military draft, and to make actual military interventions acceptable, the US needed an enemy. Truman’s 1947 Truman Doctrine speech made clear that the justification of all these policies and practices would be the “Communist threat,” the presence of the Soviet Union as our great enemy.
This enmity had not been inevitable. From the time of the Russian Revolution in 1917, American leaders were hostile toward the new Soviet entity. However, during the Soviet Union’s turmoil of the 1920s and 1930s, it hardly posed a threat to the US. Then, after Hitler’s Germany first invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941 and six months later declared war on the US, the Americans and Russians worked as allies. Most American accounts of World War II fail to recognize how central a role the Soviets played defeating Germany. Europeans fought their war mainly on the Eastern Front. Fully 80% of the German casualties came at the hands of the Red Army. The Soviet/American alliance, tense with mutual suspicion, did end the Nazi threat.
Shortly after the end of the War, US Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, recognized that it would not be in the interests of the US for an arms race to follow America’s introduction of nuclear weapons. He sought to control and limit the spread of nuclear weaponry. We should continue our alliance with the Soviets in order to limit its use. He, radically, suggested that the US voluntarily surrender its monopoly on nuclear weaponry.
Several of Truman’s top advisers agreed with Stimson. Truman, though, sided with those who wanted to sustain the American monopoly on nuclear weaponry and turned Stimson down. This choice led to a severe turn toward an adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union—and, indeed, stimulated feverish efforts by the Soviets to create their own nuclear arsenal, efforts that were successful. Such an adversarial turn enabled the national security state ideology to reign supreme in Washington. Thus began the Cold War. The leaders’ turn toward enmity against the Soviet Union led to uncritical acceptance of such enmity on the part of the general population. This uncritical acceptance resulted in the fateful embrace of blank check nationalism that made fear of the Soviet Union central to most Americans’ embedded theology.
Legacy of ashes
Americans have since followed a path fraught with violence, failed opportunities for peace, and ultimately the breakdown of the democracy story. The US began a peacetime draft for the first time in its history in 1947. This socialized young Americans into warism. Facing the likelihood of being drafted into the Vietnam conflict provided the context for my own struggle with and ultimate rejection of uncritical nationalism that I will recount in future posts.
Truman’s decision to reject Stimson’s proposal led directly to the opposite outcome. The Soviet response to the American nuclear monopoly led to a mad race that put the entire world on the brink of annihilation. Several times we came within a hair’s breadth of disaster. We remain on an extraordinarily dangerous precipice awaiting doomsday. The 1947 Truman Doctrine signaled the militarization of America’s place as the world’s great superpower. An endless series of disastrous military interventions around the world has followed down to the present day.
Even now American people have little consciousness of the “anti-American” way their nation has followed in the world. Americans in general think the best of their country and believe in its good intentions. They turn temporarily critical only in face of foreign policy failures. The embedded theology of uncritical nationalism has rarely been threatened, and never in sustainable and transformative ways. I grew up with no sense of the viciousness of the American interventions going on around the world during the 1950s. About the time I reached adulthood, though, a brief period of widespread negativity about the American Empire did surface largely due to American failures in Vietnam. As brief as this period proved to be, it lasted long enough to have a major impact on my own self-awareness as an American, as we will see.
[This is the fourth of a long series of blog posts, “A Christian pacifist in the American Empire” (this link takes you to the series homepage). The third post in the series, “On being a proud American” may be found by clicking on this title.The fifth post, “Resistance to the American Empire,” may be found by clicking on this title.]
Thanks, Ted, for the detailed analysis plus autobiography here. You’re pointing out a lot of crucial things in the combination of our “American” conscious-plus-unconscious way of thinking. And, the constantly detrimental, occasionally disastrous, results in our actions.
I appreciate getting new summary language and “labels” for key aspects of our mythologies… mainly unstated and unconscious. Interesting that I’ve just read very related analysis in Karen Armstrong’s good book, “The Bible”. She was citing Robert Cushman, Plymouth Colony’s early business agent, as justifying, on legal basis, the taking of “‘a land of which none seek to make use of it'” (p. 177).
I’ve long been particularly interested in the linkage (again, mostly unconscious) between key theological assumptions/beliefs and “political” ones that get developed as blank check nationalism, warism, etc. Such underlying frameworks are tough to pin down with specificity as to their constituent parts. In pursuit of more depth on that, I got back to a post of yours in Oct., 2021 titled something like “Why the cross is so difficult to understand” and saw that I’d read and made a brief comment on it back then… having forgotten most, if not all of it. I’ll try to get back to a further comment on that a bit later, but post it here rather than there.
Wow… I really liked (again) that post, “Why the cross is so difficult… – part 2”! Lots of points that should be in broad discussion, even for “non-theologians”, but I know very rarely are.
And for another angle: Right after reading this (above) post, I opened the latest edition of “The Christian Century” and immediately noted an in-depth article, “Postliberalism and the romantic lie”, about “Rene Girard and the new right”.
The reason I immediately thought of it (and still do after two readings) as related and of importance is the relationship between the “romantic lie” (and self/communal-deception) and “the myth of redemptive violence”. You point out the unconscious nature of that myth, as Girard seems to emphasize similarly…. it seems pretty obvious once we’ve rid ourselves of our worst blinders.
However… I’ve not read Girard himself. Only summaries and reactions (all basically positive). One thing: I used the internal search on your blog to find references to Girard and got nothing. I didn’t recall anything you’d said about him either, so I’m wondering if you have read and/or critiqued his work here or elsewhere.
Could you let us know?
A second thing: I’ve had the sense that his work, perhaps similarly to that of Jonathan Z Smith’s and Burton Mack’s, is potentially very helpful though not widely known or discussed. Additionally, that since Lyle Enright (the CC article) has elucidated some of the shared “use” of Girard by both “conservative” and “liberal” thought “communities” or individuals, I’m wondering if his concepts and body of work might serve as one potentially fertile discussion context for helping the growing work toward “depolarization” and “bridging” currently underway and growing.
Seemingly, that growth has been accelerated – as a counterwave movement to the increased anger and acrimony emerging from not just one but multiple recent political assassinations and other forms of violence.
Thanks for this, Howard. I hope to get back before long and offer some more responses to your earlier comments. But I wanted right away to say a bit about Girard. I tried pretty hard to read Girard at one point. I liked what I learned about his ideas from other people. However, when I read Girard himself I found his writing hard to connect with. He seems to me to interpose his “grand theory” between the reader and reality (especially, in what I was reading, between the reader and the biblical text). From what I could tell, I mostly agreed with his interpretations. But I didn’t really like the theoretical veneer. (One of his books, though, seemed different and I would recommend it perhaps as a good starting place, much more accessible than his other writings: I See Satan Fall Like Lightning.)
Most of the stuff in my writing that may seem Girard-like is filtered through Walter Wink. Wink has a very useful chapter on Girard in Engaging the Powers. Wink’s book is the single most important book for my theology that I can think of.
I’m glad you remember and still like my piece on atonement theology. I do hope to return to that arena at some point in the next few years and try some more to get some of the points “in broad discussion.”
Thanks for that additional info about Girard. Interesting that the book you cited was the one Enright said, in his CC article, was most “theological”. And it was the one I was most considering to perhaps get.
As to atonement concepts, it may be where I most heavily focus my upcoming reading and potentially some articles. I do think it is pivotal and that the more traditional/orthodox of Evangelicals are dancing around it, reticent to really engage with us “deconstructed” (Process in my case) or “radical reformation” folks.
I’m not sure if this will land below it, but it follows my 9-16 comment, today being 9-27. I came back to this article in your current series.
Here are a couple referrals and concepts relevant to “American Warism” and things related to it; to how international conflicts can, at least sometimes, be settled short of kinetic (or other forms of) warfare:
One is the work of a man new to me: the Swiss historian, Daniele Ganser. He has a 2023 book, “USA: the Ruthless Empire”. I’ve just seen a presentation by him on the lead-up to the 2014 Maidan Revolution, the limited invasion of Ukraine thereafter, and the “full scale” invasion by Russia in 2022.
Mainly of interest, aside from his analysis itself, is his stated alignment with John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sacs (plus other similar analysts). It was only a 40 or 45 minute exposition of his understanding of American and NATO missteps that contributed to the 2022 intensification of the war between Ukraine and Russia. Thus it was not able to speak deeply to some of the important background issues I still feel inadequately informed on (and thus reluctant to “buy into” either the more popular government/media analysis or to one advanced generally the same by those differing… cf above). It also didn’t include a pro-con weighing of various contentions of his (with people like those I’ve mentioned) over against people like former ambassador Michael McFaul or Ann Applebaum.
What I can say with a high level of confidence as valid is that every party involved in this conflict (as almost any other) has contributed one or more element that was not helpful, and heightened tension/conflict. BUT, where does one go from there??
It generally is not helpful to assign blame (from outside, nor one party toward another within), either before or after hostilities have broken out. I’ve not taken training in conflict mediation other than for family systems and interpersonal relations. Nor studied international relations formally, nor the lead-up to and conduct of war.
Given that, I’m only going to mention an emerging kind of tool that seems to have promise, based on the human-and-institutional nature principles that I DO understand in some fair depth. That is the application of digital tools that I guess would fall into the AI category, and are more than just sophisticated search tools. The little I know of them, they seem to run complex analysis of the real-time responses of negotiating parties (or those seeking consensus for differing reasons), and do so on repeated “runs” of sorting desires/demands and their prioritization relative to other desires/demands.
One proponent (and personally a developer) of such tools is a man who either has been or still is a Mennonite: Ernest Thiessen. He is from greater Vancouver, BC, area, and may even be a distant relative of mine, as I have Mennonite relatives in that area. I’ve been on one call with him, I believe, and interacted with him via email some, but don’t know him personally. His own system is called Smartsettle Infinity (website, smartsettle.com).
Among other things he’s said about it, he has a demonstration that walks through how it could work in action toward finding a mutually acceptable solution to the Palestinian/Israeli conflicts going back to 1947 (or 48?).
He also has written about how two similar programs to his, Discord and Negotiated Consensus, played a key role in a unique “election” (hybrid, in an unsettled situation) in Nepal just earlier this month. “Discord” processes, he particularly has credited with the grassroots emergence, apart from elite level negotiations initially (rather, “digital deliberation”), of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki being appointed interim Prime Minister.
I’m wondering what you, Ted, know of him, of Smartsettle Infinity or similar programs, or of what he calls the “peace tech community”?
I so far know relatively little, but am intrigued and find some hope. I can see real promise although I can’t adequately articulate why yet…. except to say that the dynamics I think I do see as operating, and the general processes advancing them, to present some new aspect to how “warring” (or disputing) parties can be brought together…. And some of that may be what is going on “between the lines” as well as in the formal processes, and thus, so far largely hidden.