Ted Grimsrud—November 11, 2025
At the end of World War II, the leaders of the United States faced one of the most fateful crossroads in the history of the nation. What kind of relationship with the Soviet Union would they pursue? Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, the relationship had been adversarial. When Hitler declared war on the US following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, new possibilities and necessities opened up for US/USSR relations. Shouldn’t our enemy’s enemy be our friend? “Friend” would be too strong of a term for what followed, but over the next several years the Soviets and Americans formed a successful alliance that defeated the Germans.
The Cold War
As the War wound down, US leaders envisioned a new adversarial dynamic. The Soviet Union had a long history of being threatened, even invaded as in the Napoleonic wars, efforts by the West to abort the Russian Revolution, and the invasion from the Nazis. As the Soviets looked to the postwar era, the need for security would define their disposition toward the world. On the other hand, the US had hardly been under serious threat during the War and emerged with an expansive sensibility oriented toward establishing the nation as the single world leader.
The US could have gone in two different directions. One would be to respect and seek to find ways to accommodate Soviet security needs. The other would be to see the Soviets as an intractable adversary. The Americans chose the second. The alliance of World War II became a “Cold War.” The US sought, most of all, to enhance its military superiority. Between 1945 and the end of the Soviet Union, the US initiated virtually every step of intensification of the conflict. The Soviets could never match America’s lead in military capability, but they could establish a rough sense of “mutually assured destruction.” This dance deepened both blocs’ warism. Eventually, the Soviets could not keep up. Their empire imploded.
The Cold War victory left the US at another fateful crossroads. A question similar to 1945 posed itself to American leaders: Would they seek to establish a collegial and mutually respectful relationship with the new Russia? Would they recognize the major shift from the ideology of the Soviet Union? Or would they see the demise of the Communist empire as an opportunity to enhance the global power of the US as the world’s single superpower?
What about NATO?
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, in negotiations with the US in 1991, agreed to accept the reunification of Germany with the understanding that the NATO military alliance would not extend any farther east toward Russia than Germany. US Secretary of State James Baker agreed with Gorbachev, though the agreement was never formalized. Some within the George H. W. Bush administration argued that a greatly diminished Russia did not have the stature to insist on such a demand. Bush did proceed cautiously, and by the end of his term in January 1993 NATO had not extended beyond the former East Germany.
The years following the end of the USSR were difficult for Russia. The economy tanked, and the country suffered from ineffective leadership. However, Russian leaders hoped for positive relationships with the West. They also unanimously opposed a NATO expansion to the east. President Bill Clinton took no action to do so during his first term. However, in 1997, several former members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact joined NATO—Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Russian leaders protested but NATO leaders paid them little mind. US leaders realized, following the end of the Cold War, that the loss of Russia as enemy would diminish weapons sales and lead to doubts about the importance of NATO itself. The decision to expand NATO required new members to reorient their military hardware to be compatible with the rest of NATO. It also retained Russia as the “Other.”
Yugoslavia’s breakup in the late 1980s provided opportunities to preserve the dominance of NATO and the US in Europe and help the American arms industry. At this point, providing for defense against a “Russian threat” played little role. The Russians had, since the early 1990s, pulled their military out of Eastern Europe and reduced its size by 70% by 1996. As well, the Russians had made it clear that they strongly desired a full rapprochement with the West. They wanted to integrate their security interests with those of NATO and the US. A new leader in Russia, Vladimir Putin, came into power in 1999 and sought closer relations with western Europe and the US. However, NATO continued to intervene in the Balkan conflicts and to voice interest in expanding NATO further to the east, including even Ukraine. These actions showed ever more clearly that NATO would be preferring a more adversarial disposition toward Russia.
A deepening rift
After September 11, 2001, Putin expressed deep condolences and offered help as the US discerned how to respond. Russia provided logistical support when the US decided to pursue military action in Afghanistan. However, the US did not seek more assistance from Russia and rather drew NATO overtly into the conflict, another offensive military intervention outside NATO’s own territory. NATO expressed interest in Ukraine as a future member in 2002. The Russians had reluctantly accepted the NATO expansion in 1997 but had expressed strong opposition to Ukraine taking take that step. Since NATO seemed to choose to be adversarial toward Russia, the idea of NATO forces in neighboring Ukraine deeply troubled Russia.
The eastern areas of Ukraine had remained Russian-speaking and favored retaining close ties with Russia. In the western and central areas, Ukrainian nationalism intensified. In Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election, the incumbent, pro-Russian government won in a close vote. Shortly after, with American backing, pro-Western forces led an “Orange Revolution” that overturned the election results. Then in 2006 elections, the pro-Russian party regained a strong majority of seats in the legislature. NATO added six former Soviet bloc countries in 2004 plus Slovenia, formerly part of Yugoslavia. The US and its allies increasingly treated Russia as an enemy. They sought to transform Ukraine into a pro-Western ally and ultimately a NATO member.
In the 2010 Ukrainian presidential election, pro-Russian candidate, Viktor Yanukovych won in a contest ruled fair by observers. The struggle in a polarized nation heightened when the US backed the overthrow of the Yanukovych government in February 2014. The new President Petro Poroshenko immediately strengthened ties with the European Union and sought NATO membership. Russia, in reaction to the coup, annexed the Crimean Peninsula, part of Ukraine but also the host to Russia’s largest warm water naval base. The large majority of the Crimeans were Russian-speakers and voted in a referendum to support the action. The Ukrainian government’s hostility toward Russian speakers led to violence beginning in 2014 in eastern Ukraine with Russia supporting the ethnic Russian forces. Envoys from the Ukraine, France, Germany, and Russia met in the city of Minsk to seek a peace agreement. The fighting continued into 2015 until a reconvened meeting in Minsk led to the Minsk II agreement.
The Ukrainians never lived up to Minsk II. Years later, European signatories, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Holland admitted they never intended to see the agreement enforced. They signed it to get the Russians to lessen their support so Ukraine could build up its military. The US redoubled its efforts to arm the Ukrainian military precisely for this purpose. The efforts to provoke the Russians—who never stopped insisting that Ukraine’s proposed entry into NATO would be utterly unacceptable—continued.
Ukraine held another presidential election in 2019. Once again, the pro-West incumbent lost decisively. The victor, political novice Volodymyr Zelensky, ran as a peace candidate and received significant support from the Russian-speaking eastern regions when he promised to implement the Minsk agreements. However, Zelensky immediately faced strong pressure from nationalist forces. He thereafter followed the nationalists’ wishes. Between 2014 and 2022, US presidents backed Ukraine by sending much weaponry as the conflict with Russia grew. Putin argued for working harder to implement the Minsk II agreement. US/NATO leaders rebuffed his efforts. As a consequence, Russia decided to act decisively to address the threat it felt.
The 2022 Russian invasion and its aftermath
As Russia felt ever more threatened, US/ NATO pushed Zelensky to be more intransigent toward Russia. Russia invaded Ukrainian territory on February 21, 2022. The invasion initially moved toward the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. Russia intended to use the invasion as a means to get the others to negotiate seriously. Russia hoped to satisfy its security concerns and end the conflict. Its main concerns involved the issues of Minsk II, especially guarantees that Ukraine would not join NATO. The Russians also sought more autonomy for the eastern Donbas region, acceptance by the Ukrainians that Crimea would remain in Russia, and a significant reduction of the power of right-wing nationalists within Ukraine.
By March 16, 2022, three weeks after the invasion, credible reports indicated that the parties were very close to an agreement that would satisfy the Russians. Before the agreements could be finalized, British Prime Minister Boris Johnson visited Zelensky in Kiev to order Zelensky to end the negotiations, which he did. Had the peace agreement been finalized, the war could have ended. However, the US seems to have seen Russia as weaker than thought, so continuing the war could cause severe damage to Russia and perhaps even lead to an end to the Putin government. The negotiations ended with the message that Ukraine would not be interested in talking further. As a consequence, the Russians recalibrated their approach to the war.
In the following three years, Russia intensified its efforts, gradually gained dominance in the battlefield, and withstood severe economic sanctions levied by the US. Russia strengthened important relations with China and members of the new BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and other global south nations, most notably Iran). These lessened the negative effects from the break with the US and NATO due to the latter’s sanctions.
Little changed after Donald Trump’ s 2024 election as the Russians remained committed to their core demands. President Biden’s profound miscalculation in hoping to exploit Russia’s perceived vulnerability actually revealed Russia’s surprising strength and resilience. Rather than isolate the Russians, US/NATO drove them to a deeper relationship with China and Iran, and stronger ties with other BRICS nations. American military technology proved unexpectedly inadequate in face of that of the Russians. The hope for a quick, successful proxy war with Russia as a springboard toward a successful confrontation with China proved false. Rather than leading to the demise of Russia, this war signaled weaknesses in the American Empire.
As this renewed Cold War turned precariously more heated, a second major military conflict further threatened the stability and sustainability of the American Empire. The ever-simmering conflict in Western Asia between the Israelis and Palestinians boiled over on October 7, 2023. Among other problems, the US alliance with Israel threatened the American Empire’s moral status like nothing before in light of Israel’s genocidal actions in Gaza. I will conclude my look at the Empire without blinders with the US/Israel/Palestinian conflict in my next post.
[This is the 21st of a long series of blog posts, “A Christian pacifist in the American Empire” (this link takes you to the series homepage). The20th post in the series, “The sorrows of empire,” may be found by clicking on this link. The 22nd post, “The fatal alliance: The US and Israel” may be found by clicking on this link.]
Thinking Pacifism 
I really wish I had enough knowledge and wisdom to actually, deeply understand the complexities of international relations. The issues with the USA and Russia, particularly, and with the troubled/suffering history of Germany/Russia/Ukraine in the midst of that, those issues are too complex to lay out well in anything less than book length, in my view. If that has been or would be done, then my priorities would mitigate against my reading it, probably 😦 .
A good, objective, thorough analysis in relation to Russia, especially as expressed in Ukraine, would seem to have to end up with some kind of blend or integration of views I’ll represent under two names I’ve used before, as familiar with both their arguments to a degree: Ann Applebaum and Jeffrey Sachs.
And even if I did grasp such complexities (and I wonder if anyone really does), it’d be another thing to have any significant influence, even indirectly, on how the USA conducts foreign policy. At the moment, the US domestic challenges seem even more threatening than the international ones (and immoral, cruel perhaps on a comparable level to bombing small boats that may or may not be smuggling drugs off the South American coast). What that all will mean for American Empire, I have little idea, though I’m hopeful.
You’re working mainly on the educational level, and that’s important. I keep searching, though only a little “on the side”, for HOW to best promote mindset changes building on a good knowledge of history and of what’s actually going on, both secretively and openly. Being Christian, I especially seek changes toward following the teachings of Jesus, whether or not in a “Christian” context or directly in his name.
Christian churches do not work on applications of “The Gospel” to our national posture, international relations, etc. Certainly not from the conservative side, other than the highly toxic “Christian Nationalism”, “Seven Mountain” or “Integralism” perspectives. And even “progressive” or social-justice-concerned churches don’t do much on a paradigm-change level. Nor does Christian “higher ed” contribute much, and often actually defends our sordid history as a nation.
What’s it going to take??